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A RESPONSE TO DAVID FORTE
HADLEY ARKES
It would almost be churlish to return to the exchange of arguments and
reasons after the way in which David Forte has framed his commendation
of my project, of my work, and (I'm embarrassed to note) of me. Professor
Forte is a man of measured judgments, and he is measured, as ever, in his
praise. I'm certain that he meant what he said, but for my own part I know
that I could not deserve that praise, in the fullness in which he offered it.
Perhaps I could gently divert attention from that praise by recalling that
cartoon in the New Yorker, showing the statue of an outsized figure in
nineteenth-century garb, with craggy face, one arm lifted, pointing toward a
lofty goal at hand, or pointing to the future. At the base of the statue, the
people, walking, looked in comparison like dwarves. And on the pedestal
the inscription read: "Soldier... Statesman... Patriot... Author... But
Still A Disappointment to His Mother." I may have to induce David Forte
to modulate his praise so that I could return, with the proper focus, and with
energy unimpaired, to resume the conversation, and the useful "argument,"
that we had arranged here.
I had asked the editors of the University of St. Thomas Journal of Law
& Public Policy to invite David Forte to offer a critique of the paper I was
presenting, because I genuinely wanted to get a reaction to the argument by
a lawyer of uncommon philosophic reflection; someone who would be
skillful in testing the argument at the seams. If we put aside the argument
over abortion itself, the serious constitutional question is just how a federal
government, of constrained powers, could legislate in forbidding the acts of
private persons in arranging, and performing, partial-birth abortions. For
the States, that is not a problem-if States were free to legislate on abortion.
But the question that would create a genuine strain for conservative jurists
was whether a federal bill of that kind could be justified by invoking the
familiar, and (to many of us) implausible formulas of the Commerce
Clause. In my own work for the bill that became known as the Born-Alive
Infants' Protection Act,' I offered a different argument, grounded in the
axioms of the Constitution. In league with John Eastman and Edwin
Meese, I sought to offer that argument again in defending the federal bill on
partial-birth abortion. And part of our purpose was to offer, for Justice
1. 1 U.s.c § 8 (2005).
Response to David Forte
Thomas, a constitutional ground that would not depend on the Commerce
Clause. That was the problem on which Professor Forte came to focus his
critique, with his usual laser-like precision.
But before he reached that point, where he called to his aid the devices
of symbolic logic, I am afraid that, in a move quite uncharacteristic for him,
he made a slip in his casting of my argument. Or he curiously misread it, in
a way that would lead the reader, I fear, to misunderstand that argument.
And because it involves the very framing of the argument, it is worth
dealing with that matter first.
Professor Forte notes my own work on Kant, but then imputes to me a
sweeping "Kantian principle of universality" that quite overshoots the
matter. Nowhere in my paper did I mention Kant or invoke such an
understanding to explain the issue at hand. What I invoked rather was the
distinct character of the American constitution and the axioms that were
central to the Constitution, as explained by Chief Justice Marshall in
Cohens v. Virginia (I'd refer the reader here back to the body of my essay).2
If there was any philosopher, not American, whose understanding had a
more direct bearing on my argument, it was the decidedly un-Kantian John
Locke. The telling passage was in the Second Treatise, where Locke
touched the logic of the separation of powers:
[I]n well-ordered commonwealths, where the good of the whole is
so considered as it ought, the legislative power is put into the hands
of divers persons who, . . . have by themselves, or jointly with
others, a power to make laws, which when they have done, being
separated again, they are themselves subject to the laws they have
made; which is a new and near tie upon them to take care that they
make them for the public good.3
That is, it makes the most notable difference for the discipline of
legislating that legislators have this obdurate fact in mind: Whatever they
legislate will be put in the hands of other people to administer, and those
could be the hands of people quite unfriendly to them. And so one had
better take care not to legislate for others a law that one would not readily
see applied to oneself.
Chief Justice Marshall caught part of the way in which that
understanding expressed itself in our own separation of powers: "the
judicial power of every well constituted government must be co-extensive
with the legislative, and must be capable of deciding every judicial question
which grows out of the constitution and laws."4 With the exception of some
rather special cases that we could explain, the main presumption in place is
2. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821).
3. JOHN LOCKE, CONCERNING CIVIL GOVERNMENT, SECOND ESSAY § 143 (Blackwell
1956) (1690).
4. Cohens, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) at 384
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that any issue that arose under the Constitution and laws of the United
States had to come within the jurisdiction of the federal courts. I have been
bringing out the corollary, which seems to come as news to many lawyers:
that any question coming within the reach of the judiciary may come within
the reach of the political branches as well. Or as the point was expressed
with more edge here: If the Supreme Court can articulate new rights under
the Constitution, the legislative branch must have the authority to vindicate
those same rights, based on the same grounds, or the same clauses, on
which the Court discovered them in the Constitution. And in filling out
those rights, the Congress would have the authority then to mark their
limits. What should not be tenable, under the logic of this Constitution-
not under anything, mind you, in the writings of Kant, but of this
Constitution-is that the Court may not articulate new rights, and then
assign to itself a monopoly of the legislative powers in shaping those rights.
Under the logic of the Constitution, the branches are not entirely in control
of their own powers. That is the peculiar character of a regime of checks
and balances, and it is the wholesome discipline of the separation of
powers.
This matter came up in the discussion, and I had sought to offer a gentle
correction to Professor Forte on this point: He suggests that my argument
depends distinctly on the Fourteenth Amendment, and on Section 5, which
authorizes Congress to enforce the Amendment. But as I pointed out in the
discussion, my argument is not bound to the Fourteenth Amendment or to
any particular clause in the Constitution: The argument would be the same
if the Court had found the right to abortion in the Privileges and Immunities
Clause of Article IV, in the original text of the Constitution. Or even in the
clause authorizing Letters of Marque and Reprisal. The argument hinges,
again, on the deep axioms or logic of the separation of powers: If the Court
found a "right to abortion" in the Privileges and Immunities Clause, the
Congress could plausibly then legislate to protect those newly found
constitutional rights, in the same way that the Congress may protect the
civil rights mentioned in the Fourteenth Amendment.
Now quite contrary to what Professor Forte suggests, nothing in this
argument rests on the assumption that the branches are wholly the same,
and that the powers exercised by the officers in those branches are the
same. Nothing here dislodges the understanding that these institutions do
work that is notably different; and yet more than that, it could be said that
the Constitution itself would be impaired in serving its purposes if those
institutions were themselves impaired in the work they distinctively did. In
one of his rare moments of lucidity, Chief Justice Taney gave us a clear
teaching on this matter in Luther v. Borden.5 That improbable case sprung
5. Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849).
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from the civil War in Rhode Island. A decision had to be made by someone
in the federal government as to which group affecting to be the legislature,
and which man affecting to be the governor of Rhode Island, had the
standing to seek the intervention of the federal government. As Taney
explained, courts were simply not constituted to deal with civil
insurrections and matters of this kind. The crisis could not be dealt with by
a trial court, for example, taking time to impanel a jury, hear witnesses, and
sort out matters of law and fact. And it was especially implausible that the
crisis could be handed by an appellate court. Surely there was no time to
call in the briefs, with lawyers on either side making oral arguments, and
with the judges retiring to their chambers to compose, at length, an opinion
to command a majority. In crises of this kind, the matter had to be dealt
with at once if it were going to be dealt with at all. And in fact, the crisis
was settled rather quickly when President Tyler announced that he was
coming in on the side of the established government in Rhode Island. The
deep lesson here was that it was not always the courts that preserved
constitutional government. At times it was the "sword of the law," wielded
by the Executive, which preserved that framework of lawfulness in which
courts were free to function.
Professor Forte has fetching things to say about the ensembles made
more wondrous and loving by meshing people strikingly different in their
natures and gifts. He should be pleased to be confirmed in the sense that
my own argument has incorporated that same understanding. None of that
dislodges the concern that the logic of the Constitution, the wholesome
discipline of the separation of powers, is subverted if the Court can
articulate new rights, sweep away the protections of law furnished by
governments in the States, and then assign to itself a monopoly of the
legislative power in dealing with those rights. Under those conditions, as I
point out, the Court may now license private killings, for wholly private
reasons, and the legislative branch somehow cannot reach to protect the
victims. The decisive point about a national government, in
contradistinction to a confederacy, was that the national government may
act directly on persons. We seem to be backing into an arrangement in
which the federal courts may reach directly to persons (in creating licenses
to take life) but in which the legislative branch cannot reach directly in that
way in order to protect the victims of the killing: We are asked to believe
that the Congress cannot act directly on persons here, even when it is a
branch of the federal government that created this new class of victims, by
sweeping away the protections of the law that had been provided by the
laws of the States. To acquiesce in this arrangement seems to me to accept
a state of affairs quite detached from the telos, the purposes, and the deep
principles of the Constitution.
There is one notable exception to the argument I have put forth: It has
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been long recognized that judges and courts should not interfere with the
decisions made by the Executive in recognizing foreign governments,
directing troops in the field, or negotiating foreign crises. (The courts were
in no position, for example, to undo the arrangements made by President
Carter as he settled the hostage crisis in Iran in 1981 and determined just
what compensation would be given to those American businesses who had
bills unpaid by Iran.)6 But this exception to the scheme I have put forth is
explained and governed by an axiom running even more deeply in the
American regime, an axiom that is truly prior to the Constitution itself.
And that is: the safety and security of the American people cannot be placed
in the hands of officers, either in the British parliament or in courts of law,
who bear no direct responsibility to the people whose lives are at stake.
THE VENTURE INTO SYMBOLIC LOGIC
Professor Forte penetrates more deeply into my argument, and deploys
the arts of symbolic logic to make these critical points: My scheme
depends on the claim that the Congress is acting upon the same rights that
the Supreme Court has found in any section of the Constitution-in this
case, a right to abortion, grounded in the Fourteenth Amendment. But in
scaling down, or even countering those rights, he insists that I'm not
actually upholding the rights articulated by the Court. I would in fact be
subverting them. I would have Congress putting in place a rule of law
strikingly at odds with what the Court has declared. But beyond that, he
argues, if I am not subverting the Court, if I would have the Congress
simply giving proportion to the rights declared by the Court, I am virtually
endorsing the main body of rights in Roe v. Wade.7 And in that way,
Professor Forte suggests, I am not subverting the Court; I am subverting
myself and my own life-long project in the pro-life cause.
The argument is quite arresting, but I would earnestly offer, in
response, that this chain of moves unfolds a meaning quite different from
the one that Forte finds in it. In the first place, it could be pointed out that
there is nothing novel, or even wrong, in the Congress countering a decision
taken by the Court. As Lincoln pointed out, the decision of the Court can
be narrowed to the settling of the case in controversy between the two
litigants. But as Lincoln argued, the political branches need not accept the
deeper principle of the decision if they have not be persuaded of its
rightness.8 And so, with that understanding, Congress passed and Lincoln
signed, a bill that would bar slavery from the territories of the United States.
6. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
7. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S 113 (1973).
8. See HADLEY ARKES, FIRST THINGS 418-22 (Princeton Univ. Press 1986); Michael
Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to Say What the Law Is, 83 GEO.
L.J. 217, 275 (1994)
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That is, the political branches had acted to counter, through an act of
ordinary legislation, the holding of the Court in the Dred Scott case.9 The
President had been elected by mobilizing opposition in the country to that
decision, and now the Executive and Congress were putting the question to
the Court in a pressing way: They were inviting the judges to take a sober
second look at what they had done, and consider whether they might have
been mistaken.
On the other hand, the bill on partial-birth abortion need not be read in
that way. It could be read as compatible with Roe v. Wade, as indeed the
Solicitor General, Paul Clement, suggested in the oral argument.' ° And in
that event, the Congress would be putting this proposal before the Court:
Whatever the Justices might have meant by a "right to abortion," surely
they could not have meant a right to destroy a child at the very point of
birth. And even if they had meant that, they might not have meant the
freedom to destroy that child with this method of gratuitous cruelty. The
bill on partial-birth abortion, presented in that way, might well be seen to be
compatible with Roe v. Wade; it might indeed be read as accepting the
rightness of Roe, at least for the moment. But could anyone doubt that the
measure, as it was presented, sprung from an understanding quite critical of
Roe, that it was part of a project to induce the Court to begin scaling down,
scaling back, that rather sweeping right to abortion that the Court had
brought forth in 1973?
But to recognize that meaning in the encounter of the branches is to
open oneself to a notably different understanding from the one that David
Forte fears I am backing into, almost without noticing. Forte argues, quite
forcefully, that if I would have Congress acting on the same rights
articulated by the Court, but giving proportion to them, or scaling them
down, I would have Congress legislating on the premise that the rights
proclaimed in Roe v. Wade were indeed legitimate and settled. But there is
another way of looking at the matter-another way that is fully
understandable if we simply grasp the point that the separation of powers
gives us an ongoing conversation among the branches. It is often said that
the Court settles these matters of constitutionality. But that is a point
proclaimed by judges, and if we had the space I would argue that it is
manifestly untrue. For these judicial decisions have a quality that the
philosophers refer to as "open-textured." There are always openings in the
weave, or strands left dangling. Senator Specter famously remarked that
Roe v. Wade must be a "super-duper" precedent because it has been
affirmed, he said, about 38 times. What he did not apparently notice is that,
in 38 cases, questions arose about the meaning or implication of what had
9. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
10. Transcript of Oral Argument, Gonzales v. Carhart, 126 S. Ct. 1314 (No. 05-380), 2006
WL 3230271 (U.S.).
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been "settled" in Roe v. Wade.11
And so we may just recall the Hyde Amendment, which refused to
provide the public funding of abortions.12 As the argument ran, if abortion
were really a private choice, so private that even the father of the child has
no standing in making the decision to abort the child, why was that surgery
now regarded as a public good, which ought be funded by the public at
large? To the surprise of many advocates of abortion, the Court sustained
the Hyde Amendment in Harris v. McRae, and the understanding that
seemed to emerge was this: Abortion is a private liberty, but there is no
right to have the public fund that private liberty.' 3 The comparison was
made to rights of speech: there may be right to speak, but the government is
not obliged to pay for a hall.
In accepting the Hyde Amendment, the Court gave a certain proportion
to the right it had articulated in Roe v. Wade; it scaled back or limited that
right in a manner that delivered a jolt of news to many supporters of
"abortion rights." Could it plausibly have been said that Henry Hyde and
his supporters had endorsed the right to abortion, had accepted its
legitimacy, as they set about trying to put boundaries on that right? Clearly,
Hyde and his allies did not mean to deepen the premises and the durability
of Roe v. Wade. They were earnestly seeking to put that decision on the
course of extinction. But they would seek that end by drawing the courts
into a conversation on what exactly that right to abortion meant. The
Justices evidently had not thought out all of the dimensions of that right.
And when the matter is put to them, in a concrete way, in one case after
another, it is not to be ruled out that some of the Justices may indeed come
to take a sober second look. Some of them may even come, over time, to
the judgment that the earlier Court might have been mistaken.
It may seem paradoxical that the political branches may engage the
judges in this way, accepting for a moment what the courts have decided,
but then seeking to cut back or undo what the judges have done. And yet,
we need to remind ourselves that this exercise is precisely what may be
enjoined upon us by an ethic of collegial respect in the separation of
powers. As Lincoln argued, once the Court had decided the Dred Scott
case, he and his friends would not form a mob to free Dred Scott. 4 A
11. The Hearing on the Nomination of Judge Samuel Alito to the Supreme Court Before the
Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. (2006), 2006 WL 75414 (F.D.C.H.).
12. Hyde Amendment, Pub. L. No. 94-439, §209, 90 Stat. 1434 (1976).
13. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
14. "...We oppose the Dred Scott decision in a certain way, upon which I ought perhaps to
address you a few words. We do not propose that when Dred Scott has been decided to be a slave
by the court, we, as a mob, will decide him to be free. We do not propose that, when any other
one, or one thousand, shall be decided by that court to be slaves, we will in any violent way
disturb the rights of property thus settled; but we nevertheless do oppose that decision as a
political rule which shall be binding on the voter, to vote for nobody who thinks it wrong, which
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decent respect for a regime of law impelled the political officers to respect
the judgments of the courts, at least as those judgments bore on the parties
before the court. Still, it was quite compatible with a regime of law to
accept the decisions of the Justices, to treat them with respect, and yet with
full honesty and conviction to challenge them, step by step, in an effort to
put to them, in a concrete way, the implications of what they had done.
And in that manner, of course, to induce them to step back or change their
minds. Surely there would be no more dramatic example under this head
than that crafty opinion written by Lincoln's Attorney General, Edward
Bates, as he issued an Opinion of the Attorney General on the way that the
Lincoln Administration would understand the holding in the Dred Scott
case. Bates recalled that the Court, under Chief Justice Taney, had cast its
judgment under a "plea of abatement." The Justices would find a want of
jurisdiction for the courts in hearing the case, and a want of standing on the
part of Dred Scott to contest it. Bates recalled Lord Coke's insistence that
pleas of abatement had to be constrained; they had to be "certain to a
certain intent in every particular." "In practice," said Bates, these pleas "are
always dealt with very strictly." With that sense of the matter, he
"explained" the meaning that the Lincoln Administration would give to the
decision in Dred Scott:
Taking the plea, then, strictly as it is written, the persons who are
excluded by this judgment from being citizens of Missouri must be
negroes, not mulattoes, nor mestizos, nor quadroons. They must be
of African descent, not Asiatic, even though they come of the
blackest Malays in southeastern Asia. They must have had
ancestors, (yet that may be doubtful if born in slavery, of putative
parents, who were slaves, and, being slaves, incapable of
contracting matrimony; and therefore every child must needs be a
bastard, and so, by the common law, nullius filius, and incapable of
ancestors.) His ancestors, if he had any, must have been of pure
African blood, not mixed with the tawny Moor of Morocco, or the
dusky Arab of the desert, both of whom had their origin in Asia.
They must have been brought to this country, not come voluntarily;
and sold, not kept by the importer for his own use, nor given to his
friends. 1"
shall be binding on the members of Congress or the President to favor no measure that does not
actually concur with the principles of that decision. We do not propose to be bound by it as a
political rule in that way, because we think it lays the foundation not merely of enlarging and
spreading out what we consider an evil, but it lays the foundation for spreading that evil into the
states themselves. We propose so resisting it as to have it reserved if we can, and a new
judicial rule established upon this subject." Abraham Lincoln, The Lincoln-Douglas Debates, in 3
THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 255 (Roy P. Basler, ed., Rutgers Univ. Press
1953)
15. Edward Bates, Opinion on "Citizenship," November 29, 1862, in 10 OPINIONS OF THE
ATrORNEYS GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES 382, 412 (J. Hubley Ashton, ed., W.H. & O.H.
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With this construction, of course, there was nothing left of the holding
in Dred Scott, and yet, as Bates remarked, "In this argument, I raise no
question upon the legal validity of the judgment in Scott v. Sandford."'6 I
submit again: It is possible to respect the judgments of the Court, without
endorsing them; to challenge the Court, while engaging earnestly in a
conversation or argument, to induce the Justices to recede from their
judgments.
I am tempted to recall that old line from a common law judge of the
nineteenth century, who professed not to be sure whether he had settled the
law with his judgment-or unsettled it. But he lodged the hope that, in
another case, a judge more gifted than he would one day settle it. I know
that the argument I have put forth, as compelling as it seems to me, has not
yet settled even the judgment of my friends and allies. But David Forte,
with his critique, has sharpened the question in the most illuminating way.
And perhaps then the two of us, in combination, have helped to move other
writers to the kind of clarity of mind that may indeed, one day soon, settle
the understanding here more surely.
Morrison 1868).
16. Id.
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